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f the monetary authority can make a binding promise concerning future
monetary policy, what policy should it follow? If the monetary authority
cannot make such a promise, how should it behave on a period-by-period
basis? How one answers these questions reﬂects one’s beliefs about how the
economy works, what monetary policy is feasible, and how outcomes should
be evaluated. Economists work with explicit models of the economy and
impose explicit welfare criteria in order to answer questions about optimal
policy. This approach facilitates reasoned debate. If one disagrees with a pol-
icy being advocated, that disagreement necessarily reﬂects disagreement with





not reached a consensus about the appropriate model of the macroeconomy
to be used for monetary policy analysis, this article cannot provide deﬁnitive
answers to questions about optimal policy.
Thedistinctivefeatureofthemodelisthatﬁrmsdonotcontinuouslyadjust
thepricesofgoodstheysell. Instead, thepriceofanyindividualgoodchanges
only periodically. Such price stickiness is observed for many goods (see the
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1 Parts of this article summarize research described in more detail in King and Wolman (1996
and 1999), and parts can serve as background for Khan, King, and Wolman (2000 and 2001).
Goodfriend and King (1999 and 2000) contains much complementary discussion of monetary policy
in the type of model used in this article.
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survey in Wolman [2000]) and forms an important channel through which
monetary policy can affect aggregate economic outcomes.
As in the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon
(1983), policy surprises have the potential to improve welfare under certain
conditions; there is a time-consistency problem for monetary policy. In con-
trast to that work, however, here the current-period policy problem is affected
by the nature of future policy because the model involves multiperiod pricing.
Unlike much work on optimal monetary policy, the model in this article
does not generate welfare losses associated with the area under the money
demand curve; that is, there are no shoe leather costs of inﬂation.2 This
modelingchoiceallowsustofocusonissuesrelatedtostaggeredprice-setting.
The same approaches described here can easily be applied to models in which
therearebothstaggeredprice-settingandshoeleathercostsofinﬂation. Khan,
King, and Wolman (2000) contains such an application.
The model delivers two important results regarding optimal policy. First,
it is beneﬁcial for the monetary authority to be able to make binding promises
about its future behavior. As in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983), if binding promises are not feasible, we should expect a rel-
atively high inﬂation rate. Under current arrangements, it is not possible for
the Federal Reserve to make binding promises. If it were possible, the model
prescribes that in the long run, inﬂation should either be zero or just slightly
positive, depending on whether the policy objective is present value welfare
or steady state welfare.
1. THE MODEL ECONOMY
As is standard in modern economic models, the fundamental assumptions of
thismodelconcernwhotheagentsare, theirpreferencesandendowments, the
technology to which they have access, and the market structure. Here there
are three types of agents: households, ﬁrms, and the government. I will give
an overview of the model before describing it in mathematical terms.
There is a large number of identical households. Households are assumed
to live forever and to obtain utility from leisure time and from consuming
goodsproducedbyﬁrms. Consumptionandleisureinthepresentarepreferred
to the same amount of consumption and leisure in the future. Households’
endowments consist of one unit of time in each period and ownership of the
ﬁrms. Time is allocated between labor supply to ﬁrms—in exchange for wage
income—and leisure. Households also demand government-supplied money
in an amount identical to their nominal consumption spending.
2 Shoe leather costs of inﬂation are the resource costs individuals and ﬁrms incur in order to
economize on holdings of currency, which does not bear interest. See Bailey (1956) and Friedman
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Firms produce consumption goods using a technology that relies only on
labor. Their objective is to maximize the present value of proﬁts distributed
to households, and to achieve this objective they set prices and hire labor. It
is also assumed that ﬁrms may only adjust their prices every two periods (I
assume that a period is three months). This shortcut imposes price stickiness
of a magnitude arguably lower than that observed in the United States. As
for market structure, in this model there is a large number of ﬁrms producing




in the form of lump-sum transfers from the government to consumers.
Households
Households’ preferences for consumption (ct) and leisure (lt) in the present





where the subscript t indexes time. For the examples below, I will specify the
utility function to be
u(c,l) = lnc + χ · l, (2)
where χ>0 is a ﬁxed parameter. The household’s total consumption is an
index of consumption of a unit measure of different goods. In keeping with
the market structure and pricing behavior described below, we need to keep
track of only two types of goods, each with measure 1/2: those with prices set
in the current period, indexed by 0, and those with prices set in the previous






















This consumption index implies that households have constant elasticity de-







where Pj,t is the nominal price of a good with price set in period t − j, and
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For derivations of (4) and (5), see the appendix to Wolman (1999).
The household’s budget constraint requires that consumption spending
not exceed the sum of wage income and ﬁrms’proﬁts (Dt):
Ptct ≤ Ptwtnt + Dt, (6)
where wt is the real wage. The household’s time constraint requires that its
labor supply and leisure time not exceed its endowment of one unit of time:
lt + nt ≤ 1, (7)










The sum is multiplied by 1/2 because nj,t is labor hired per j-type ﬁrm, and
halftheﬁrmsareofeachtype. Householdsalsodemandgovernment-supplied
money in an amount identical to their nominal consumption spending:
Mt = Ptct, (9)
where Mt is nominal money balances.
The key equation from the household’s side of the model is optimal labor
supply,whichcanbedeterminedbymaximizingu(ct,l t)subjecttothebudget
constraint and time constraint:
wt · uc (ct,l t) = ul (ct,l t), (10)




If the household were to marginally increase the quantity of labor it supplies,
the utility-denominated value of additional labor income would be exactly
offset by the utility loss associated with the decrease in leisure time.
Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, each producing
a unique differentiated product. As mentioned above, ﬁrms set their price for
two periods—which implies P1,t = P0,t−1—and half of the ﬁrms adjust their
price in any given period. This pattern is known as staggered price-setting.
Each ﬁrm has the same production technology:
cj,t = nj,t,j= 0,1. (12)
When ﬁrms adjust, they choose a price that will maximize their present dis-
counted proﬁts over the two periods for which the price is ﬁxed. As owners
of the ﬁrms, consumers instruct ﬁrms to value current and future proﬁts usingA. L. Wolman: Optimal Monetary Policy 31
the marginal utility of income, which is uc (ct,l t) for the current period and
uc (ct+1,l t+1) for the next period.










uc (ct,l t)ctwt + βuc (ct+1,l t+1)ct+1wt+1πε
t+1





where the inﬂation rate in period t + 1i sg i v e nb yπt+1 ≡ Pt+1/Pt. This
expression makes the marginal present discounted value of proﬁts zero for an
adjusting ﬁrm.3 Firms would like to charge a price that is a constant markup
of ε/(ε − 1) over marginal cost, and in this model marginal cost is equal to
the real wage. Because the price level may change over time and prices are
set for two periods, it is generally impossible for a ﬁrm to achieve this ideal
markup in every period. Firms do the best they can, which typically means
setting a markup higher than ε/(ε − 1) in periods when they adjust. If they
were to choose the ideal markup, they would maximize proﬁts in the ﬁrst
period of each price cycle, but in the next period proﬁts would be low because
inﬂation would erode the ﬁrm’s real price. The proﬁt function is concave, so
it is optimal to sacriﬁce some proﬁts in both periods rather than maximizing
proﬁts in one period. Another way to view the optimal price is that it achieves
the ideal markup with respect to a quasi-weighted average of marginal cost in
the two periods of the price cycle.
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the wage rate and the prices of individual consumption goods
are such that households maximize present discounted utility with their la-
bor supply and consumption demand decisions, and ﬁrms maximize present
discounted proﬁts with their price-setting decisions. In addition, equilibrium
requires a speciﬁcation of monetary policy.
We can use many of the equations stated above to eliminate variables so
that a complete description of equilibrium reduces to as few as two difference
equations in the two variables c0,t and c1,t. One of those equations is ﬁrms’
optimal pricing equation (13), and the others are determined by monetary
policy. Theappendixshowshowtheoptimalpricingequationcanbeexpressed
intermsofarelationshipbetweenc0,t,c 1,t,c 0,t+1,andc1,t+1.Thatrelationship










3A detailed derivation is provided in Wolman (1999). See also Yun (1996). Note that in
Wolman (1999), the factor   discounts nominal proﬁts, so that the different exponents on inﬂation









is the present discounted marginal
proﬁt of a ﬁrm choosing its price in period t, and optimal pricing behavior
requires present discounted marginal proﬁt to be zero. In (13) I solved this
equation for the optimal price P0,t/Pt, but it will be easier to work with in the
form shown in (14). The function x (a,b) is the equilibrium value of current
marginal proﬁt (with respect to price) for a ﬁrm that sells quantity a, when
prices and demands are such that half of all ﬁrms sell quantity a and the other




is the marginal proﬁt in period t
ofaﬁrmsettingitspriceinperiodt;thatﬁrmsellsquantityc0,t, asdoallother
ﬁrmssettingtheirprice, whileﬁrmschargingapricesetinthepreviousperiod
sell quantity c1,t. The form of the other equation(s) needed to characterize
equilibrium is determined by monetary policy.
Two Distortions to Summarize Outcomes
Consumption and leisure are the fundamental variables that households in
the model care about. Thus, good monetary policy makes consumption and
leisure behave in ways that households like. It is important to stress that in
this model the central bank does not directly control consumption and leisure.
Nonetheless, the central bank’s choices regarding the money supply affect
some relative prices in the model—in particular, the relative prices of goods
set in the current and previous periods—and these relative prices in turn affect
consumption and leisure.
Byfocusingonhouseholds’preferencesandthetechnologyforproducing
goods, we see there is an optimal allocation that serves as a useful benchmark
for policy. Analyzing this outcome leads us to deﬁne two measures of dis-
tortions, summarizing deviations from the optimal allocation. The relative
price distortion effectively makes the economy operate inside its production
possibilityfrontier. Themarkupdistortionactsasataxonlaborinput, placing
the economy at an inefﬁcient point on the production possibility frontier. If
thetwodistortionsareeliminated,theoptimalallocationisattained. Themon-
etary policy problem can then be thought of as minimizing these distortions.
The optimal allocation is referred to as the ﬁrst-best. To ﬁnd the ﬁrst-best,





subject to (3), (7), (8), and (12). Note that this problem is entirely static;
the only dynamic element of the model involves price-setting, and the ﬁrst-
best overcomes price stickiness. The six ﬁrst-order conditions to this problem
makeitclearthatc0 = c1 = c andn0 = n1 = n.Thesolutionforconsumption




cfb,1 − cfb 
= ul
 
cfb,1 − cfb 
, (15)
lfb = 1 − cfb.
In the ﬁrst-best, the technology for producing aggregate output is identical to
the technologies for producing individual outputs (12). The marginal product
ofaggregatelaborintheproductionofaggregateoutputisthus1.0. Inaddition,
themarginalrateofsubstitutionbetweenconsumptionandlabor(ul/uc)equals
the marginal product of labor. This condition is reﬂected in (15).
Referring back to the full staggered price-setting model, there are two
ways in which outcomes can deviate from the ﬁrst-best. First, the implicit
technology for producing aggregate output may not be identical to the tech-
nologiesforproducingindividualoutputs. Thatis,ct <n t becausec0  = c1.In
addition, the marginal rate of substitution may not be equated to the marginal
product of labor. That is, uc
 
cfb,1 − cfb 
 = ul
 
cfb,1 − cfb 
, or equiva-
lently wt  = 1.
Deviations from the equality of consumption and labor input will be de-








Deviation of the real wage from unity will be denoted by µt and referred to








Because the real wage is equal to real marginal cost in this model, (17) shows
thatthemarkupissimplytheinverseofrealmarginalcost. Thesetwoequations
allow us to move between working in terms of consumption and leisure and
working in terms of the relative price distortion and the markup. In other
words, given consumption and leisure, (16) and (17) allow us to compute the
two distortions, and given the two distortions, the same two equations allow
us to compute consumption and leisure implicitly.
To see why the relative price distortion is so named, replace the denom-
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P1,t ) is sufﬁcient for determining the relative price distortion.
In a ﬂexible price model with perfect competition, the markup and the
relative price distortion would both equal unity (ρt = µt = 1). With ﬂexible
prices but the monopolistic competition structure of the model, the relative
price distortion would still be unity, but the markup would exceed unity (µt =
ε
ε−1 > 1): with monopoly power, ﬁrms set prices above marginal cost. With
staggered price-setting as well as monopolistic competition, the relative price
distortion and the markup generally exceed unity. But with staggered price-
setting, monetary policy can affect these distortions. Policy’s leverage over
therelativepricedistortionisstraightforward: themorevariabilityintheprice
level, the greater the relative price distortion.
There are two components to policy’s leverage over the markup. First,
the markup is affected by the level of inﬂation even if the inﬂation rate is
constant; this relationship will be detailed in Section 3. Second, with some
prices predetermined, policy surprises will affect the level of real activity and
the markup. This second mechanism is conventional, yet quite complicated.
Suppose that instead of the pricing structure in our model, all prices were
reset every period, but in every period they were chosen before any other
information was revealed. Then it would be obvious that surprise increases
in money raise output, simply from the money demand equation (9). The
price level would be treated as ﬁxed, so increases in money would correspond
to increases in consumption. In our model, however, only some prices are
predetermined. So, again referring to the money demand equation, whether a
surprisemonetaryexpansionresultsinanexpansioninoutputdependsonhow
the ﬁrms that set their price in the current period respond to the expansion.
And,becausethoseﬁrmssettheirpricefortwoperiods,theirresponsedepends
on their expectations about the behavior of price setters and monetary policy
in the next period. Extending this line of reasoning, one can see that the entire
path of future policy matters.
2. DIFFERENTAPPROACHES TO OPTIMAL POLICY
Even for a particular explicit model of the private macroeconomy, there is
not just one reasonable notion of optimal monetary policy. The reasons for
this ambiguity were suggested at the outset; they involve disagreements about
the appropriate welfare criterion and about the nature of policy institutions.
A welfare criterion is used to rank different policies, and the rankings willA. L. Wolman: Optimal Monetary Policy 35
generally differ according to the welfare criterion. Institutions matter because
they affect the range of feasible policies.
I will discuss three common notions of optimal monetary policy as they
apply to the staggered pricing model. The ﬁrst and second differ according to
whether the welfare criterion is steady state welfare or present value welfare,
whereas the second and third differ according to an institutional assumption
that changes the set of feasible policies. In each case, I ignore shocks to the
economy, sotheonlychangesthatoccurovertimeareduetomonetarypolicy.
Perhaps the simplest notion of optimal policy is the idea of an optimal
steady state inﬂation rate: view the monetary authority as choosing the inﬂa-
tion rate, and ask what constant inﬂation rate is best. With a constant inﬂation
rate, outcomes in each period are identical. Because there is no uncertainty
in the model, and there are no fundamental state variables that affect the set
of feasible outcomes, it seems sensible to require that the central bank pick a
constantinﬂationrate. However, itwouldalsobeinterestingtocheckwhether
in fact the policymaker would choose a constant inﬂation rate. Thus, a second
natural approach to optimal policy involves assuming that the policymaker
has the same welfare criterion as households. One can then ask how inﬂation
would behave over time: would it be constant, and would it end up at the
optimal steady state inﬂation rate?
Both of these approaches to optimal policy maintain that the policymaker
(central bank) can credibly promise (commit to) how it will behave in current
andfutureperiods. Thisisnotatrivialassumption. Forinstance, theFeddoes
not make explicit, detailed promises as to how it will behave in the future.
Factors such as reputation may make for implicit commitments in the Fed’s
behavior, but these factors are probably not strong enough to make either of
the ﬁrst two approaches to optimal policy practically relevant in the current
institutionalenvironment. Ithereforeconsiderathirdnotionofoptimalpolicy,
which maintains the assumption that the policymaker’s welfare criterion is
identical to the representative agent’s, and further assumes that policy cannot
commit in any way to future actions. Each period, the central bank acts in
the best interests of society. The central bank cannot dictate what its behavior
will be in the next period, but it foresees what form that behavior will take.
These three approaches to optimal policy do not have the same impli-
cations. In the ﬁrst two cases, the results differ in an interesting qualitative
dimension, although quantitatively they are quite close. When the welfare
criterion is steady state welfare, the central bank will choose a small but posi-
tive level of inﬂation, as this reduces the markup distortion. In contrast, when
the central bank is allowed to behave in a time-varying manner and still can
committofuturepolicies,optimalpolicyleadsinthelongruntozeroinﬂation.
This pair of results has an analogue in the golden rule versus modiﬁed golden
rule idea in growth theory, which is explained in Section 4.36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
If, as in the third case, the central bank cannot commit, the nature of
optimal policy changes more dramatically. The steady state equilibrium in
this case involves rather high inﬂation. Loosely speaking, because the central
bankinthecurrentperiodcannotaffectthebehaviorofthenextperiod’scentral
bank, it takes what it can get in the current period. The central bank chooses
to exploit ﬁrms that set their price in the past, as a way of trying to drive down
the markup.
3. OPTIMAL POLICY I: STEADY STATE WELFARE
Our ﬁrst notion of optimal policy has as its criterion the steady state level of
welfare. Examining steady state welfare as a function of inﬂation answers the
question, What average level of inﬂation should a central bank target? This
is a sensible policy question, though not the most obvious one to ask in the
context of models like the one used here. I will return to this point in Section
4. Todeterminetheoptimalsteadystateinﬂationrate, Iwillﬁrstderivesteady
state allocations for an arbitrary inﬂation rate.
In a steady state equilibrium, all real variables are constant. Nominal
prices grow at a constant rate, the steady state inﬂation rate. If π is the steady
stateinﬂationrate,weﬁndthesteadystatevaluesofallvariablesbyeliminating
time subscripts on the real variables in the equilibrium conditions and setting
πt = π. From the consumption aggregator, the demand function, and the
optimal pricing equation ((3), (4), and (13)), we can derive an expression for





















In addition, from (4) for j = 0 and 1,
css
0 /css
1 = π−ε. (20)
Thelevelofconsumptionisimplicitlydeterminedbysubstitutingtheprevious






























For a given speciﬁcation of preferences (u(c,l), which determines the func-
tions uc and ul), (20) and (21) allow us to compute css
0 ,c ss
1 and thus css,l ss
andthetwodistortionsasfunctionsofthesteadystateinﬂationrate. Imposing
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Figure 1 Steady State Relative Price Distortion as a Function of
Inﬂation
The variable π is the gross quarterly inﬂation rate.
and
lss (π) = 1 −
1
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Figures 1 and 2 plot the steady state markup and relative price distortions
as functions of the steady state inﬂation rate. The relative price distortion
is minimized—and in fact eliminated—at zero inﬂation, whereas the markup
is minimized but not eliminated at a very low positive inﬂation rate. Zero
inﬂationeliminatestherelativepricedistortionbecauseitresultsinallnominal
prices being constant and equal. It is less obvious why a low positive inﬂation
rate should minimize the markup.
To understand the relationship between steady state inﬂation and the
markup, it is helpful to begin by using the price level deﬁnition (5) to write38 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Steady State Markup Distortion as a Function of Inﬂation,
Normalized to µ(1.0) = 1.0
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, (24)
where MC is nominal marginal cost. The effect of inﬂation on the markup
depends on the effect of inﬂation on the markups charged by the two types
of ﬁrms. In steady state, the markup of type one ﬁrms is simply the markup










because P1 = P0/π. Using (23) and (24) it is easy to show that the markup
of type zero ﬁrms is increasing in the inﬂation rate (except at high rates of
deﬂation). This is also intuitive: to protect themselves from the real price
erosion caused by inﬂation in the next period, ﬁrms set a higher markup when
they do adjust. Thus, whether the aggregate markup increases in inﬂation
depends on whether the effect of inﬂation on P0/MC is strong enough to
overwhelm the erosion effect of inﬂation on P1/MC. It turns out that for very
low inﬂation, the erosion effect dominates, so the aggregate markup falls with
inﬂation. But for even moderately high inﬂation, the effect of inﬂation on
adjusting ﬁrms’prices is strong enough that the aggregate markup rises.A. L. Wolman: Optimal Monetary Policy 39
Figure 3 Steady State Welfare as a Function of Inﬂation
The variable π is the gross quarterly inﬂation rate.








Using the expressions for steady state consumption and leisure, we could
analytically characterize the optimal steady state inﬂation rate. It is more
revealing, though, to look at a picture. Just as Figures 1 and 2 plot the markup
and relative price distortions as functions of the steady state inﬂation rate,
Figure 3 plots steady state welfare as a function of inﬂation. The vertical
dashed line indicates the inﬂation rate that minimizes the markup (for ε = 4),
andtheverticalsolidlineindicatestheinﬂationratethatminimizestherelative
price distortion (zero inﬂation).As we should expect, the welfare maximizing
inﬂation rate is between the two that each minimize a distortion. It is notable
that the optimal steady state inﬂation rate is positive in this model, but it is
only slightly positive—at approximately 0.4 percent per year—for ε = 4.
4. OPTIMAL POLICY II: PRESENT VALUE WELFARE WHEN
THE POLICYMAKER CAN KEEP ITS PROMISES
Steady state welfare is an intuitively appealing welfare criterion, but it is not
the only natural choice for our model. Present discounted welfare, deﬁned by
(1), is another natural welfare criterion. I will henceforth refer to this simply
as optimal policy. If there is an initial period to the policy problem, then
optimal policy may not involve choosing a steady state—if it did, we would40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
get the same answer as that in the previous section. In fact, under present
value welfare maximization, inﬂation does vary over time, and it converges to
a rate in which steady state welfare is lower than was found in Section 3 in the
best steady state (King and Wolman [1999] ﬁrst presented this result). Period
welfareduringthetransitiontosteadystateishigherthanitisinthebeststeady
state. Note that the optimal policy problem is viewed as being solved once
and for all in an initial period, and initial periods are more important than later
periods precisely because the future is discounted.
Toﬁndtheinﬂationbehaviorthatmaximizeswelfare, Iusewhatisknown
in optimal taxation problems as the primal approach. Under the primal ap-
proach, instead of searching for the policy behavior that maximizes welfare,
one ﬁrst searches for the optimal allocations that are feasible for the policy-
maker and then (as a secondary step not provided here) determines a rule that
would achieve those allocations.
Recall the discussion of equilibrium above. There I showed that an equi-
librium was described by at least two difference equations: one representing
optimal price-setting and the other(s) depending on policy. Here the addi-
tional difference equation(s) must be generated by optimality conditions for
policy. To ﬁnd those optimality conditions, write down the policy problem as
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for c1,t when t = 0:

































In these expressions, uc () (ul ()) refers to the partial derivative of the utility
function with respect to consumption (leisure), and xj () refers to the partial
derivative of the function x () with respect to its jth argument. The ﬁrst-order
conditionsforc0 andc1 inperiodzerohaveadifferentformthantheﬁrst-order
conditions in all later periods. This reﬂects the fact that in period zero there is
no previous policy commitment to be honored, so policy takes advantage of
preset prices to expand output.4 After period zero, the ﬁrst-order conditions
for c0,t and c1,t contain a term that involves the optimal pricing condition for
the previous period (t − 1).
It might seem odd that the optimality conditions for some period t>0
should take into account a response of ﬁrms in the previous period. The ex-
planationisthatpolicyisdeterminedinperiodzeroforallsubsequentperiods.
Firms choosing their price in period t − 1 act not only in response to current
variables, but also in anticipation of period t variables, and the period zero
policymaker takes this effect into account when choosing period t variables.
If prices were set for more than two periods, policy with regard to period t
variables would affect behavior more than one period in advance, and there
would be more than one initial period for which the optimality conditions
differed from their eventual form.
Thefactthattheﬁrst-orderconditionsforoptimalpolicytakeonadifferent
forminperiodzerothaninallotherperiodsisindicativeofatime-consistency
problem: the optimal behavior to which the policymaker committed in period
zerowouldnotbemaintainedifthepolicymakerwereallowedtoreoptimizein
alaterperiod. Thatlaterperiodwouldeffectivelybecomeanew“periodzero,”
differing from all subsequent periods. But if reoptimization were believed to
be a possibility, the policy problem would not make sense as written above.
Firms would not believe that a binding policy commitment had been made,
and the policymaker would be unable to determine anything but the current
period outcome. I return to the lack-of-commitment scenario in Section 6.
For now I maintain the assumption that the policymaker can credibly commit
to his or her behavior into the inﬁnite future.
4 For a more detailed discussion of this type of optimization problem, see Kydland and
Prescott (1980) and Marcet and Marimon (1999).42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The difference equations described by the ﬁrst-order conditions for c0,t
and c1,t, together with the pricing constraint, describe a complicated dynamic
system. However, King and Wolman (1999) show that this system has a par-
ticularlysimplelimitpointwithuniquelocaldynamics, namelyzeroinﬂation.
Insimpleterms,ifthepolicymaker’soptimalitycriterionispresentdiscounted
utility, then he or she will choose a path that approaches zero inﬂation in the
long run.
It is somewhat surprising that optimal policy approaches a steady state
withlowerwelfarethanmaybeattainableinsteadystate. However, thisresult
has an analogue in growth theory that can help us understand what is going
on. The result from growth theory involves what are known as the golden rule
and the modiﬁed golden rule. Under the golden rule, the stock of capital is
that which supports the highest possible steady state consumption. However,
a planner maximizing present value utility would not choose to build up or
maintain this level of capital stock. Instead, the planner would choose to
accumulate less capital; while this would lead to lower consumption in the
longrun,intheshortrunconsumptioncouldbehigherastheexcesscapitalwas
converted to consumption goods. Because present consumption is assumed
to be preferred to future consumption, such a plan is optimal (see Blanchard
and Fischer [1989, 45] and McCallum [1996, 49]).
A similar phenomenon occurs in the staggered pricing model. In the long
run, theeconomywillapproachasteadystatewithahighermarkupandhence
lower consumption than is feasible. However, this is optimal because the
transition path generates higher consumption and a lower markup than can be
achieved in the optimal steady state described in the previous section.5
The long-run limiting behavior under optimal policy with commitment
corresponds to what Michael Woodford (1999) has called a timeless perspec-
tive. Under the timeless perspective, the policymaker behaves each period in
the way he or she would have promised to behave if asked to commit in the
long-distant past. Woodford advocates that the long-run limiting behavior un-
der the full-commitment solution be adopted in every period by policymakers
who can commit, in part because that behavior leads to stationary outcomes
over time: period zero is not treated as special. However, optimality of the
long-run limit is inextricably linked to the high welfare levels in transitional
start-up periods; speciﬁcally, the long-run limit is optimal only as part of an
entire path that includes the start-up periods.6 If commitment is feasible and
5 Unpublished work by the author suggests that the transition path can be complicated, for
example displaying nonmotonic behavior of the markup. It is clear, however, that there are some
periods during the transition in which the markup is lower and utility is higher than in the optimal
steady state.
6 Woodford conducts his analysis in a different model, where the steady state is unaffected by
monetary policy. The distinction between the golden rule and modiﬁed golden rule steady states
thus does not exist in Woodford (1999).A. L. Wolman: Optimal Monetary Policy 43
the optimality criterion requires that policy be stationary, then optimal policy
in the current model is represented by the optimal steady state of Section 3.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) take this approach.7
5. OPTIMAL POLICY III: PRESENT VALUE WELFARE
WITHOUT COMMITMENT
Maintaining the natural welfare criterion of the previous section, suppose that
no promises are credible. Policy cannot commit to future actions, and thus
the current policymaker cannot affect expectations about future outcomes.
Effectively, there is a new policymaker each period. One can again use the
primal approach to study this problem. The current period policymaker will
choose c0,t and c1,t subject to the constraint imposed by optimal price-setting,
with the location of this constraint determined by the expected levels of c0,t+1
and c1,t+1. Once the problem has been thus expressed, it is straightforward
to interpret the policymaker’s choice variables as the two distortions (markup
and relative price), rather than the two consumption levels.
If policy can commit to future actions, optimal policy varies over time. In
the initial period the policymaker optimally takes advantage of preset prices
byexpandingoutput. Pricingbehavioranticipatesallfutureactions,sonosur-
prisesarepossibleaftertheinitialperiod. Nonetheless, thedynamicpathdoes
not immediately reach the long-run limit. In contrast, when the policymaker
cannotcommit, thecurrentperioddoesnotdifferfromanyotherperiod:every
period is an initial period. The policy problem is stationary, and this leads me
to look for a stationary equilibrium with discretionary optimization.8
Before discussing the details of characterizing equilibrium, I will brieﬂy
relate the analysis to Barro and Gordon (1983), with which some readers may
be familiar. There, equilibrium was determined by analyzing how current
policy responded to expectations about current policy. In contrast, I will
analyzehowcurrentvariables(whicharedeterminedbycurrentpolicysubject
to the pricing constraint) optimally respond to the expected future variables
(which determine the location of the pricing constraint). A ﬁxed point of this
relationship is a steady state equilibrium with discretionary policy. In Barro
andGordon’smodel,aslongasoneabstractsfromreputationalconsiderations,
there is no reason for future policy to play a role in equilibrium because
prices are not set for multiple periods. Furthermore, all relevant expectations
7 For an interesting and detailed discussion of the timeless perspective, see Dennis (2001).
8 Without commitment, there may be many equilibria. We describe the unique Markov-Perfect
equilibrium (see Krusell and Rios-Rull [1999]), meaning the equilibrium that is determined by the
economy’s natural state variables. Because there are no state variables in our model, the Markov-
Perfect equilibrium is a steady state. Khan, King, and Wolman (2001) discuss a variant of this
model where prices are set for three periods and there is thus one natural state variable. They
ﬁnd multiple equilibria.44 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
are determined simultaneously with the policy action. Herein, on the other
hand, future policy directly affects current behavior, and the timing is more
complicated. The policymaker takes as given the prices set by ﬁrms in the
previous period, but current price-setting ﬁrms make their decisions after the
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In principle, it is straightforward to work with this formulation. However, it
is easier to develop intuition by transforming the problem so that the choice
variables are the two distortions introduced earlier, instead of c0 and c1. To
express c0 and c1 implicitly as functions of µ and ρ, use (16) and (17). The
appendix derives c1/c0 =   (ρ), c0 =  (µ,ρ), and hence c1 =   (ρ) ·




  u(µ,ρ) + β · v  
(P1 )
subject to
0 =   x (µ,ρ) + β  x
 
µ ,ρ  
(26)
ρ ,µ  ,v  given.
It is easy to analyze this transformed problem graphically.
Figure 4 illustrates the nature of (P1 ) and its equilibrium for the same
example used above. The markup is on the horizontal axis, and the relative
price distortion is on the vertical axis. The ﬁgure is similar to the indifference
curve/budgetconstraintgraphscommoninmicroeconomicswiththreeimpor-
tant exceptions. First, welfare is increasing toward the origin because the two
distortions can be thought of as bads not goods. Second, unlike in textbook
examples from microeconomics where the budget constraint is a ﬁxed line,
heretherearemanyconstraints(acontinuum,withonlythreeconstantsshown
in the ﬁgure) because there are many possible outcomes in the next period,
and outcomes next period determine the location of the constraint (µ  and ρ 
appear in (26)). Finally, recall from microeconomics that optimal behavior
implies a tangency between the budget constraint and an indifference curve.
The multiple constraints here create the possibility of multiple tangencies, soA. L. Wolman: Optimal Monetary Policy 45
Figure 4 Stationary Equilibrium without Commitment
in order to identify the equilibrium among these tangencies (assuming the
equilibrium is unique), one needs more information. The locus of steady state
points provides this information.
The mildly concave downward sloping curves are indifference curves as-
sociatedwiththeindirectutilityfunctionin(P1 ); welfareisincreasingtoward
the origin, at which point both distortions would be eliminated. The indiffer-
ence curves slope downward because both objects are bads; if the markup
rises, the relative price distortion must fall for welfare to be unchanged.
The convex parabolic curves are pricing constraints for three different
assumptions about the future markup and relative price distortion (µ  and ρ ).
To explain the shape of the pricing constraints, I will focus on the ﬂat points
that occur for each constraint at ρ = 1. When ρ = 1, it is also the case that
c0 = c1 = c and P0 = P1 = P: all ﬁrms charge the same price and sell
the same quantity. For the constraint corresponding to a given pair (µ ,ρ ),
the ρ = 1 point reveals the current markup (and thus real marginal cost) for
which a relative price equal to unity maximizes the present value of proﬁts.
Nowvaryrealmarginalcosteitherupordown; fromequation(13)theoptimal
price will change, necessarily moving away from the price set by ﬁrms in the
previous period. With the two types of ﬁrms charging different prices, the
relative price distortion is necessarily greater than one. The further marginal
cost moves from the level associated with no relative price distortion, the
greater the relative price distortion that must be accepted. This explains why
therelativepricedistortionrisesalongeveryconstraintaswemoveawayfrom
the point where ρ = 1.46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The curve that slices through the middle of the ﬁgure—apparently posi-
tively sloped—is the locus of points that correspond to steady state equilibria;
to compute this locus, I impose a steady state and vary the money growth rate,
tracing out the (ρ,µ) locus that results. Along the steady state locus, moving
upwardusuallycorrespondstoraisingthesteadystateinﬂationrate. Athigher
rates of inﬂation, the dispersion—and hence distortion—in relative prices in-
creases. The average markup also usually rises with the steady state inﬂation
rate:highermarkupsbyadjustingﬁrmsmorethanoffsettheincreasedmarkup
erosion experienced by nonadjusting ﬁrms.9
A policymaker in the current period takes as given ﬁrms’ expectations
aboutthefuture. Theseexpectationsdeterminetherelevantpricingconstraint,
and the policymaker chooses levels of the current distortions such that an
indifference curve is tangent to the relevant pricing constraint. At such a
point, the rate at which ﬁrms’behavior allows the policymaker to trade off the
markup against the relative price distortion is equated to the rate at which the
policymaker’swelfarefunctiontradesoffthemarkupagainsttherelativeprice
distortion. The former rate is given by the slope of the pricing constraint, and
thelatterisgivenbytheslopeoftheindifferencecurve. Asindicatedabove,for
arbitrary expectations about the future, a tangency point does not represent an
equilibrium. Giventhefutureoutcome, asingletangencypointdoesrepresent
optimal policy and private sector equilibrium in the current period, but there
is no guarantee that the future outcome taken as given is an equilibrium. If
the future outcome and the current outcome are identical, then we have an
equilibrium: the outcome taken as given in the future is found to be optimal
in the current period, and because the future looks just like the present, that




µ  = ε/(ε − 1)
 
and the relative price distortion will be eliminated  
ρ  = 1
 
.Thisistheoutcomeinasteadystatewithzeroinﬂation,anditisalso
the long-run limit point under optimal policy with commitment. This point is
helpful in understanding the nature of equilibrium even though it is not itself
an equilibrium. The current period policymaker then faces the dashed pricing
constraint, which passes through the steady state locus at µ = ε/(ε − 1) and
ρ = 1. It is feasible for the current policymaker to achieve the same outcome
9 Some readers will correctly infer from Figures 1 and 2 that the steady state locus in Figure
4 is nonmonotonic and has a second branch not shown in the ﬁgure. The argument goes as follows.
As the steady state inﬂation rate falls from high levels, the markup and the relative price distortion
fall together, but at a low positive inﬂation rate shown in Figure 2, further decreases in inﬂation
lead to higher markups, whereas the relative price distortion continues to fall until inﬂation turns
into deﬂation. There is a small downward sloping portion of the steady state locus that corresponds
to the low inﬂation region where the relative price distortion is rising with inﬂation and markup
is falling with inﬂation. There is also a second branch of the locus—upward sloping—that lies to
the right of the branch in Figure 4. One can show that no steady state equilibrium lies on this
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expected in the future. Because that outcome is the limit point of optimal
policy under commitment, it is indicated with a heart in Figure 4. Because the
relative price distortion is eliminated, the pricing constraint passes through
this point with zero slope. Immediately this point can be ruled out as an
equilibrium because the indifference curves have negative slope everywhere.
A policymaker contemplating the heart outcome would see that he or she
could do better by accepting some relative price distortion in exchange for
a lower markup. Speciﬁcally, a policymaker facing µ  = ε/(ε − 1) and
ρ  = 1 would choose the point marked with a slashed circle; it is on the same
pricing constraint but tangent to an indifference curve with higher welfare.
This tangency is not an equilibrium, though, because it implies a different
outcome in the current period than in the future.10
Asteadystatediscretionaryequilibriumisapointonthesteadystatelocus
at which an indifference curve is tangent to a constraint. The point marked
with a smile is the unique steady state equilibrium. The relative price dis-
tortion is fairly high, so the pricing constraint is steeply downward sloping
and at this point is tangent to an indifference curve. It is feasible for the pol-
icymaker to reduce the markup from this point, but doing so would require
an increase in the relative price distortion big enough to make welfare fall.11
The high relative price distortion corresponds to a high inﬂation rate (around
15 percent annually). Comparing the steady state equilibrium under discre-
tion to the heart-shaped point, which represents the limiting behavior under
commitment, it is clear that in the long run the economy is worse off without
commitment. Eventhoughthediscretionarypolicymakeractsinsociety’sbest
interest, society would be better off if the policymaker could credibly commit
to future policy actions.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Therehasbeenanexplosionofresearchinrecentyearsonsticky-pricemodels
with optimizing agents (see Taylor [1998]). At least three notions of optimal
monetary policy are natural in these models: the optimal steady state inﬂation
rate; thepaththatmaximizespresentvaluewelfarewhenpolicycancommitto
futureactions;andtheequilibriumthatoccurswheneachperiod’spolicymaker
10 To be clear, equilibrium does not necessarily imply constant outcomes over time. In the
current model, however, with optimal discretionary policy there are no exogenous forces leading
to changing outcomes over time. Thus, a Markov-Perfect equilibrium involves constant outcomes.
11 Peter Ireland (1997) shows that when all ﬁrms set their price before the policymaker
moves and for just one period, in an otherwise similar model there is no interior Markov-Perfect
equilibrium. Because all ﬁrms charge the same price, unexpected monetary expansions have no
cost to the policymaker in Ireland’s model. No matter how high an inﬂation rate is expected,
the policymaker would always choose to bring down the markup by making inﬂation even higher.
Here there is an interior Markov-Perfect steady state because higher inﬂation exacerbates the relative
price distortion.48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
maximizes present value welfare, but no policymaker can commit to future
actions.
In one model where nominal factors affect real allocations only because
of staggered price-setting, I obtain the following results. The optimal steady
state inﬂation rate is slightly positive (less than 1 percent) because a very
small amount of constant inﬂation decreases the economy’s average markup.
Apolicythatmaximizespresentvaluewelfareundercommitmentleadstoward
zeroinﬂation, forthehighermarkupthatwillresultinthelongrunispreceded
by a lower markup in early periods that are weighted more heavily. When
policy cannot commit, the inﬂation rate that results from optimizing behavior
is quite high, on the order of 15 percent. Corresponding to the higher inﬂation
rate without commitment is a lower level of welfare for the representative
agent. Ifstaggeredprice-settinginfactrepresentstheprimarychannelthrough
which monetary policy affects real variables, the results in this article indicate
thevaluetosocietyofinstitutionsthatallowthemonetaryauthoritytocredibly
commit to future behavior.12
APPENDIX
1. EQUILIBRIUM PRICING CONSTRAINT
From the optimal pricing condition (13) we can derive (14), an equation in
c0,t,c 1,t,c 0,t+1, and c1,t+1 only. The ﬁrst step is to use the demand function






  −1/ε ,




is given by the consumption aggregator (3).
For the right hand side, again use the consumption aggregator to eliminate ct





















12 Practically speaking, a speciﬁc commitment about the nature of future policy could never
be completely credible. However, feasible institutional arrangements can tie the policymaker’s hands
somewhat, decreasing the severity of the time consistency problem. For a comparative study of
institutional arrangements for monetary policy in various countries, see Bernanke et al. (1999).A. L. Wolman: Optimal Monetary Policy 49




























and use the demand functions for c0 and c1 to write the inﬂation rate in terms
of current and past c0 and c1:
πt+1
 



































































































































collecting terms according to whether they contain β factors, we arrive at
0 = c0,t ·









− ε · ul,t

 + (31)
β · c1,t+1 ·









− ε · ul,t+1

.
This yields (14) in the text, with
x (a,b) ≡ a ·
 





−ε · ul (c(a,b),l(a,b))
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(Notethatc(a,b) ≡ c(b,a)andl (a,b) ≡ l (b,a)andthatin(31)Ihaveused










by writing them as
uc,t.)
2. c0 AND c1 AS FUNCTIONS OF THE TWO DISTORTIONS
The deﬁnitions of the two distortions immediately imply
µ = a/w = a ·
uc (c(c0,c 1),l(c0,c 1))














From (34), it is clear that the ratio c1/c0 depends only on ρ. That is, c1/c0 =
  (ρ), where   (ρ) is the function deﬁned implicitly by (34). Substitute this
function into (33) to get
µ = a ·
uc (c(c0, (ρ) · c0),l(c0, (ρ) · c0))
ul (c(c0, (ρ) · c0),l(c0, (ρ) · c0))
, (35)
which implicitly gives c0 as a function of µ and ρ.That is, c0 =  (µ,ρ), and
hence c1 =   (ρ) ·  (µ,ρ).
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